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Introduction 
It is now well-known that the individual income tax in the United States is not 
"marriage neutral"; that is, a couple's tax liability nearly always changes upon marriage. 1 
Many couples pay more taxes as married than they pay in total as single individuals, so 
that they face a "marriage tax". Many other couples receive a "marriage subsidy" because 
their joint taxes decline with marriage. The existence of this marriage tax/subsidy stems 
from conflicting goals in the design of the income tax: ensuring that families with equal 
income pay equal taxes, and ensuring that income is taxed at progressive rates. Pursuing 
these goals of horizontal equity across families and progressive taxation necessarily 
implies that the additional goal of marriage neutrality cannot be achieved. 
The existence of the marriage tax has attracted enormous amounts of public 
attention in recent years, and eliminating or reducing the marriage tax has been a stated 
goal of many bills introduced in the last Congress. However, largely lost in the attention 
devoted to the treatment of married taxpayers in the income tax is the treatment of single 
taxpayers in the tax. The inference that might easily drawn from the media and political 
discussions is that married couples pay more in taxes than similarly situated single 
individuals. However, this conclusion is quite erroneous. With rate schedules and other 
features of the income tax (e.g., standard deductions) that vary for married couples versus 
single taxpayers, a single individual faces an income tax liability that is significantly 
different - and typically much larger - than a married couple with similar (combined) income 
and other characteristics. Of course, the tax structure reflects the broad desire of society 
1 See, for example, Bittker (1975), Rosen (1977), and Whittington (1999). 
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to make the unit of taxation the family, not the individual. However, this differential tax 
treatment of singles versus married couples is present and significant. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this differential has been noticed by single taxpayers, even if it has 
clearly been overlooked by many others. 
In this paper we examine the relative tax treatment of single individuals and married 
taxpayers, in order to quantify the magnitude of the tax difference. We construct various 
types of "representative taxpayers" using hypothetical and constructed information on their 
characteristics as singles and as married couples. We then determine the difference in 
income taxes paid by representative single taxpayers and by married taxpayers with 
similar incomes. Our calculations consistently show that a single individual pays a much 
greater income tax liability than a married couple with identical income; that is, there is 
what might be termed a "singles tax" in the current tax structure. Only when we adjust 
incomes by various equivalence scales do we find this singles tax diminished and, in many 
cases, eliminated or even reversed. Strikingly but unsurprisingly, nearly all recent 
Congressional proposals to reduce the marriage tax have the additional effect of 
increasing the singles tax. 
The next section briefly discusses the income tax treatment of the family in the 
United States. The following sections present our methodology and our results. We 
conclude with a summary of our results, as well as with an evaluation of the impact on the 
singles tax of recent bills targeted on a reduction in the marriage tax. 
Income Taxation over the Years 
2 
The federal individual income tax was established in 1913 with the passage of the 
16th Amendment to the Constitution. In the original structure of the income tax, the 
individual was the unit of taxation, so that each individual was taxed on the basis of his or 
her own income independently of marital status. In this setting, the income tax was largely 
marriage neutral. The Revenue Act of 1948 introduced income splitting for couples. 
Couples were now allowed to aggregate and then to divide in half their jOint income in 
calculating their federal tax liability. In combination with progressive marginal tax rates, 
the introduction of income splitting created a tax reduction - a marriage subsidy - for most 
married couples. 
The marriage tax was not widely present until the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which 
was enacted largely due to concerns on the part of single individuals about their tax 
burden relative to married couples (Rosen, 1977). This Act created a separate rate 
schedule for single individuals, which guaranteed that a single taxpayer could not pay 
more than 120 percent of the tax liability of a married couple with identical income. 
Changes in the income tax laws since 1969 have altered the magnitude of the marriage 
tax, and have also maintained the marriage subsidy for many couples, especially those 
with a single earner. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (1996), there are 59 
provisions in the individual income tax code that contribute to a marriage tax or subsidy, 
and over one thousand federal laws in which benefits received or taxes paid depend in 
some way upon marital status. 
The magnitude of the tax change with marriage is often large. Aim and Whittington 
(1996) estimate that the marriage tax has averaged roughly $400 in recent years. Within 
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this overall average, there is substantial variation. The percentage of families that pay a 
tax has risen to nearly 60 percent, and these families face an average marriage penalty of 
roughly $1200. In contrast, the percentage of families receiving a subsidy has fallen to 30 
percent, and the average subsidy for this group is $1100. 2 
The income tax treatment of the family is often misunderstood, and this confusion 
leads to the frequent and incorrect conclusion that single taxpayers are taxed less than 
married couples. Understanding the marriage tax requires answering the question: How is 
a married couple taxed in comparison to the taxes the individuals in the household would 
pay if they were instead single? The marriage tax arises because the tax burden of the 
combined income of two married individuals is greater than the combined tax burdens on 
their separate incomes were they not married. However, understanding the singles tax 
requires answering a different question: How is an individual taxed in comparison to a 
married couple with the same income? A single individual with identical income to a 
married couple pays in virtually all cases a greater amount in taxes than the couple. It is 
this latter circumstance that we have termed the singles tax. 
An example may help clarify the fundamental issues. Consider first the tax 
treatment of a married couple with adjusted gross income (AGI) of $30,000 and no children 
in 1999. The couple is eligible for a married standard deduction of $7200 and 2 personal 
exemptions of $2750; if the couple files jointly, then its income tax liability is $2599. Now 
assume that the income is evenly split between the partners, so that each has an 
2 Feenberg and Rosen (1995) generate similar estimates; Congressional Budget Office (1997) 
estimates suggest that a higher percentage of families receives a subsidy (51 percent) and a lower 
percentage pays a tax (42 percent). 
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individual AGI of $15,000. If they were single taxpayers, each would have a standard 
deduction of $4300 and a personal exemption of $2750. The resulting income tax liability 
on each individual would be $1196, for a combined total of $2392. Hence, the couple 
faces a marriage tax because their tax liability increases by $207 solely due to a change in 
their legal status as taxpayers. The existence and magnitude of the marriage tax will 
depend on the distribution of income across the two partners because its calculation 
requires comparing taxes as single versus taxes as married. This split of household 
income across partners is a central issue in determining the existence of a marriage tax or 
a marriage subsidy. If one person in this couple had most or, especially, all of the family 
income, then the couple would experience a reduced income tax liability - a marriage 
subsidy - as a result of marriage. 3 
The singles tax arises because a single individual with AGI of $30,000 pays more 
taxes than a married couple with the same income. With the standard deduction for 
singles of $4300 and a personal exemption of $2750, this individual has a income tax 
liability of $3446. Recall that the married couple with identical AGI pays taxes of $2599. 
The single individual therefore faces a singles tax of the difference between these tax bills, 
or $847. Note that the married tax liability used in determining the singles tax is 
independent of the split of marital income between the partners; that is, we do need to 
know the change in the couple's tax liability with marriage in order to calculate the singles 
tax, but only their tax liability as a married couple. 
3 For example, a married couple with an AGI split of $30,000-$0 between the two individuals faces a 
married tax liability of $2599 on their married AGI, as before, but their combined tax liability as single 
individuals is $3446. 
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The existence of the marriage tax or subsidy is hard to defend. Indeed, few even 
attempt to do, and the reduction of marital tax burdens has been a major focus in recent 
Congressional legislation. Again, however, the effects of the income tax on single 
taxpayers has been largely lost in the uproar over its effects on married taxpayers. As 
we demonstrate in the following sections, these singles tax effects can be substantial. 
Methodology 
We use various types of representative taxpayers to calculate the change in federal 
income tax liability that occurs with a change in marital status. We determine the federal 
income tax liability for different household types (e.g., single, married filing jointly, head of 
household, and married filing separately) with identical adjusted gross incomes (AGI). The 
difference in income taxes for singles versus nonsingles is our measure of the singles tax. 
All calculations are based upon the 1999 tax code. 
Our basic calculations involve several steps. First, each taxpayer type is assumed 
to take the appropriate standard deduction and relevant number of personal exemption(s).4 
AGI is allowed to vary between $0 and $350,000, and family size is allowed to range from 
zero to four children. Second, the federal income tax liability is calculated for each 
taxpayer type using the 1999 tax code. If applicable, the calculations include the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. Third, the difference in tax liability between a 
single taxpayer and a non-single household is our measure of the singles tax. 
4 The relevant standard deductions in 1999 are $4300 for single households, $7200 for married 
couples filing jointly, $6350 for heads of household, and $3600 for married couples filing separately. The 
personal exemption is $2750. 
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These basic calculations are modified in several ways. Following Dickert-Conlin 
and Houser (1998), we include in some of our calculations the main poverty transfers for 
which households are eligible, using federal guidelines for the federal food stamp program 
and Pennsylvania guidelines (as a state with a median level of transfers) for Temporary 
Aid to Needy Families (TANF) transfers. 5 In these calculations, we assume that AGI 
represents earned income, and, because of the variety of special considerations regarding 
the calculation of food stamp benefits, we assume that each representative household 
receives the maximum benefits for the relevant income and family size categories. 
In addition, we examine in some calculations the effects of taxpayer use of itemized 
deductions, rather than standard deductions, using estimates of itemized deductions by 
income level and filing status from 1996 Statistics of Income data, adjusted to 1999 levels 
by the rate of inflation over this period. 
Finally, it is obvious that a single household and a married household with identical 
AGI are not truly equals, so that the simple difference in tax liabilities between singles and 
non-singles may not adequately measure the singles tax. Accordingly, we adjust taxpayer 
income by two alternative measures of household equivalence scales, and then 
recalculate the singles tax. One household equivalence scale uses a ratio of actual AGI 
and projected federal poverty thresholds for 1999 to determine equivalent AGI by 
household type (Congressional Budget Office, 1998, Table A-6). This calculation follows 
the federal usage of adjusted family income, defined as cash income divided by the 
5 Both sets of eligibility requirements and schedules of benefits can be found at the State of 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's homepage, at www.dpw.state.pa.us. 
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relevant poverty threshold, to rank families using equivalence scales that underlie official 
government estimates of the poverty threshold for families of different sizes. A second 
household equivalence scale follows the recommendation of Garner et al. (1998), who 
treat the needs of a child as 70 percent of those of an adult. Using the government 
poverty-based equivalence scales, the singles tax for a single taxpayer versus a married 
couple with 0 children at an (unadjusted) AGI of $30,000 is -$155, so that there is actually 
a "singles subsidy"; using the Garner et al. (1998) scale, the singles taxes is -$881. 
However, the identification of the appropriate household equivalence scale for welfare 
comparisons is difficult and controversial (Pollak and Wales, 1979; Fisher, 1987; Garner et 
aI., 1998). Accordingly, we rely mainly on the unadjusted singles tax in most of our 
discussion. 
Results 
We focus on three basic sets of results in our discussion. Table 1 presents 
estimates of the singles tax when single individuals and married couples (of different sizes) 
are assumed to use the relevant standard deduction and when married couples file jointly. 
These calculations ignore any possible receipt of transfer payments, and they do not 
adjust by any equivalence scales. Table 2 allows for the presence of food stamps and 
TANF, while continuing to ignore equivalence scales. Table 3 then calculates the singles 
tax with family income adjusted in accordance with government estimates of family 
equivalence scales based on poverty thresholds and still incorporating transfer payments. 
These results are also shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Remember that we have made 
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estimates of the singles tax under a wide range of alternative assumptions: that taxpayers 
itemize their deductions (with and without equivalence scales, and with and without 
transfers), that single taxpayers are compared to heads-of-households or married couples 
filing separately (again, with and without equivalence scales, and with and without 
transfers), and that household equivalence scales are based upon the Garner et a\. (1998) 
approach rather than the poverty-threshold approach. The results conveyed in Tables 1, 
2, and 3 are largely unaffected by these alternative scenarios and methods.6 
Table 1 clearly demonstrates that single taxpayers face a substantial singles tax. 
The size of this tax increases somewhat sporadically with income. For example, the 
increased tax burden on singles relative to a 2-person married couple is only $443 at an 
AGI of $10,000 and reaches a maximum of $7342 at an AGI of $175,000. It then falls 
somewhat to roughly $6000 at income levels above $300,000 as the tax benefits of 
standard deductions and personal exemptions are ultimately phased out for higher income 
taxpayers. The singles tax also increases with family size, due to the tax advantage of 
more personal exemptions. At an AGI of $50,000, the singles tax increases by $912 for 
each additional household member, or the value of the tax savings of one personal 
exemption. The corresponding increases in the singles tax are $1809 at an AGI of 
$100,000 and $1108 at an AGI of $150,000, before falling to $891 at an AGI of $200,000 
and eventually to $0 at AGllevels around $300,000 as tax deductions are phased out. 
The introduction of food stamps and TANF modifies these results to a significant 
6 Some of these alternative results are shown in Appendix Figures 1 to 6. All results are available 
upon request. 
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degree (Table 2). Note that eligibility for these transfers is phased out above an AGI of 
$30,000, so that Table 2 does not present full results above this level. Program eligibility 
and transfer amounts are determined by income level and family size, so that the impact 
on the singles tax differs across the size and income level of the married household. In 
general, however, consideration of transfers increases the singles tax, by a significant 
amount, because single person households are eligible for smaller transfers than 
households with additional adults and children. Consider, for example, a single person 
earning $10,000 compared to a married couple with the same earnings and 0 children. 
Adding transfers increases the singles tax from $443 to $1727, or by $1284. If instead the 
married couple had 4 children, the singles tax increases by nearly $9000, or from$4246 to 
$13,046. 
Table 3 adjusts the married couple's AGI by the family equivalence scale implied by 
the poverty thresholds. For example, consider the calculation of the singles tax for a 
single individual with AGI of $30,000 and a 2-person married couple with identical AGI. As 
discussed earlier, because there is an additional family member in the married couple, its 
AGI is not comparable to the single individual's AGI, and is in fact lower than $30,000 
because of the additional family expenditures implied by the presence of an additional 
person. The single individual's AGI is therefore adjusted, or reduced, by the equivalence 
scale implied by the poverty thresholds. For a 2-person household the poverty-based 
adjustment factor applied to the single taxpayer's AGI is 0.777; that is, a single individual 
with AGI of 77.7 percent of the AGI of a 2-person married couple has equivalent 
purchasing power to the 2-person household, at least according to the poverty thresholds. 
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Similarly, the poverty-based adjustment factor for a 3-person household is 0.646, and the 
number adjustment factor continues to decline with increasing family size. Table 3 
presents the singles tax when the single taxpayer's income is adjusted by these implied 
scales. 7 Note that the income levels indicated in Table 3 are the initial, or unadjusted, 
levels. 
Not surprisingly, these adjustments substantially alter the singles tax. At lower AGI 
levels, singles still face a tax liability that is greater than comparable married taxpayers. 
However, as AGI increases beyond $30,000, and marginal tax rates accordingly increase, 
the reduction in the single taxpayer's tax liability implied by the adjustment of the single's 
income for family size becomes progressively larger. Consequently, our calculations 
generate a singles subsidy for nearly all income levels above $50,000. For example, at an 
(initial) income level of $100,000, the single taxpayer receives a subsidy that varies from 
$2159 to $8191. The subsidy generally increases with income and family size. 
Of course, the relevant consideration here is the validity of the adjustment factors in 
the equivalence scales. These adjustment factors are based upon the poverty thresholds, 
and their application to taxpayers with income levels far in excess of these thresholds 
seems problematic. The use of larger adjustment factors would lead to a smaller singles 
subsidy and could actually restore the singles tax. Nevertheless, these poverty thresholds 
are widely used as equivalence scales, and there are few alternative measures that are 
7 Instead of reducing the single taxpayer's income by the adjustment factor, we have also increased 




Our calculations indicate that a single individual faces a much greater income tax 
liability than a similarly situated married couple. This singles tax tends to rise with income 
and family size, at least until the various tax benefits are phased out. The incorporation of 
income-tested transfers generally increases the singles tax at lower income levels. The 
adjustment of incomes by family equivalence scales necessarily reduces this singles tax, 
and often creates a singles subsidy. 
Despite the obvious differences in taxes paid by single taxpayers versus married 
couples, the vast bulk of legislative (and media) attention has been devoted to the 
marriage tax/subsidy. In the recent Congress, there were at least 25 proposals designed 
to reduce or eliminate the marriage tax/subsidy (Table 4). Many of these proposals would 
increase the standard deduction for married couples filing jointly to double the standard 
deduction for single taxpayers. Other proposals would reintroduce a secondary-earner 
reduction for middle income households, provide marriage tax relief for recipients of the 
EITC, increase the tax brackets for married couples filing jOintly to double those of single 
taxpayers, reduce overall tax rates, or allow income splitting and separate filing for married 
couples. Several proposals would combine these various features into a single package. 
All proposals would lessen the importance of the two basic conditions that generate a 
8 We have calculated the adjustment factor that would be required to reduce the singles tax (or 
subsidy) to zero. This calculation allows the equivalence scale to vary with income level. 
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marriage tax or subsidy: imposing taxes based upon household income (rather than upon 
individual income), and imposing taxes at marginal tax rates that vary with income (rather 
than that are proportional to income). As a result, all proposals would reduce the size of 
the marriage tax paid by many married couples, and would also increase the marriage 
subsidy received by many other couples. 
However, their effects on the singles tax are decidedly different. In fact, these 
proposals would in nearly all cases substantially increase the size of the singles tax. 
Table 5 calculates the impact of several standard and generic proposals on the singles 
tax: an increase in the married standard deduction to double the standard deduction of a 
single taxpayer, the introduction of a secondary-earner deduction equal to a percentage of 
the earned income of the spouse with lower earnings,9 an increase of $3000 in the phase-
out of the EITe, an increase in the tax brackets of married couples to double the brackets 
of single taxpayers, and an overall reduction in marginal tax rates of 5 percent for all 
taxpayers.10 We present only those calculations for a single taxpayer versus a 2-person 
married couple; also, incomes are not adjusted for family size, and transfers are not 
considered. 
These calculations indicate that proposals designed to aid married taxpayers often 
have the additional effect of further penalizing single taxpayers. For example, doubling 
the standard deduction for married taxpayers increases the singles tax by an amount that 
9 We assume income splits of 51/49 and 75/25 percent. 
10 Another approach to the marriage tax is to replace the existing income tax with a flat tax, as 
proposed by Rep. Armey (R-TX). The Armey flat tax plan consists of a 19 percent flat tax with a single 
taxpayer standard deduction of $11,600, a married household filing jointly standard deduction of 
$23,500, and personal exemptions of $5,000 per person. 
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ranges from $200 to $500. More significantly, doubling the married tax brackets increases 
the singles tax by an amount that increases significantly with income; at AGllevels above 
$100,000, the additional tax on singles always exceeds $1000, and reaches nearly $9000 
at an AGI of $350,000. The only reform that reduces the singles tax is an overall reduction 
in marginal tax rates of 5 percent. This reform reduces taxes for all taxpayers, but reduces 
taxes more for single than for married taxpayers. 
Much of the discussion in Congress has been framed in terms of the inequity of 
unequal tax treatment by marital status. Even aside from the somewhat capricious effects 
on the equity of the income tax, there is increasing evidence that the marriage tax (and the 
marriage subsidy) distorts decisions in an array of dimensions. 11 The marriage tax may 
also weaken the family as a basic societal institution, thereby leading to a range of social 
problems. 
However, it is important to recognize that there is an enormous, and increasing, 
diversity of family structures in the United States. In 1948, when the family became the de 
facto unit of taxation in the individual income tax, the "traditional family" was typically a 
single-earner household with a stay-at-home spouse. Now, two-earner families are the 
norm, cohabitation among opposite and same-sex couples is common, and non-marital 
and extra-legal joint living arrangements are widespread. These newer types of 
households are, by many definitions, a family. However, they are treated very differently, 
and much less favorably, than the traditional households once envisioned by the tax code. 
11 For example, see Aim and Whittington (1999) and Dickert-Conlin (1999) for empirical evidence on 
marital decisions. For a more general survey of much of this literature, see Aim, Dickert-Conlin, and 
Whittington (1999) and Whittington and Aim (2000). 
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A single individual can also be seen as a type of family, and this paper demonstrates that 
singles are typically penalized, often quite heavily, by the income tax. 
It may well be, as many argue, that the importance of the traditional family unit 
justifies favorable tax treatment. However, it may also be time to recognize that a diverse 
society can no longer treat one family structure so differently than others. Elimination of 
the family as the unit of taxation, and restoration of the individual as the unit, would 
eliminate the marriage tax/subsidy. It would also eliminate the singles tax. 
15 
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Table 1. 
Singles Tax for Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayers 
(No Transfers and No Equivalence Scales) a 
Size of Married Household 
Income Level 
2 3 4 5 
0 0 7 8 8 
5000 0 1362 1663 1663 
10,000 443 2742 4246 4246 
15,000 848 3095 4469 4469 
20,000 848 2863 4166 4166 
25,000 848 2064 3843 3863 
30,000 848 1760 2790 3560 
35,000 1134 2046 2959 3871 
40,000 1784 2696 3609 4521 
45,000 2434 3346 4259 5171 
50,000 3084 3996 4909 5821 
60,000 3831 5101 6209 7121 
70,000 3846 5116 6386 7656 
80,000 4146 5416 6686 7956 
90,000 4446 5716 6986 8256 
100,000 4746 6016 7286 8556 
125,000 5249 6101 7204 8556 
150,000 6082 6934 7787 8639 
175,000 7342 8332 9235 10,087 
200,000 7342 8233 9124 10,015 
225,000 7144 7837 8530 9223 
250,000 6946 7441 7936 8431 
275,000 6550 6847 7144 7441 
300,000 6278 6387 6496 6605 



























a All calculations assume the use of the relevant standard deduction and the use by married couples of the 
tax schedule for married couples filing a jOint return. 
Table 2. 
Singles Tax for Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayers 
(Transfers and No Equivalence Scales) a 
Size of Married Household 
Income Level 
2 3 4 5 
0 2616 4879 7100 9164 
5000 2576 6194 8715 10,779 
10,000 1727 5238 8798 10,862 
15,000 848 7115 9581 10,541 
20,000 848 2863 9278 10,238 
25,000 848 2064 3843 9935 









a All calculations assume the use of the relevant standard deduction and the use by married 
couples of the tax schedule for married couples filing a joint return. 
Table 3. 
Singles Tax for Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayers 
(Transfers and Equivalence Scales) a 
Size of Married Household 
Income Level 
2 (0.777) 3 (0.646) 4 (0.513) 5 (0.436) 
0 2616 4879 7100 9164 
5000 2110 5449 7688 9590 
10,000 1219 4523 8021 9816 
15,000 346 4754 6768 7543 
20,000 179 1801 6293 6908 
25,000 12 737 2016 7819 
30,000 -155 167 598 1021 
35,000 -322 -98 116 623 
40,000 -489 -363 -250 200 
45,000 -373 -629 -615 -223 
50,000 -35 -894 -980 -646 
60,000 89 -845 -1711 -1492 
70,000 -534 -1836 -3174 -3119 
80,000 -1158 -2826 -4538 -4996 
90,000 -1768 -3817 -5901 -6575 


















a All calculations assume the use of the relevant standard deduction and the use by married 
couples of the tax schedule for married couples filing a jOint return. The proportion used to adjust 
the single individual's income is indicated in parentheses. 
Table 4. 
Marriage Tax Relief Legislation in the 106th Congress 
Bills Sponsor Main Features 
H.R. 108 Rep. Knollenberg (R-MI) The standard deduction for married couples filing jointly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers. 
H.R. 725 Rep. Kleczka (D-WI) 
H.R. 2020 Rep. Johnson (R-CN) 
H.R. 2085 Rep. Hooley (D-OR) 
H.R. 2574 Rep. Maloney (D-CN) 
H.R. 2646 Rep. McCarthy (D-NY) 
S.284 Sen. McCain (R-AZ) 
S.1160 Sen. Grassley (R-IA) 
H.R. 1453 Rep. Lampson (D-TX) A deduction for two-earner married couples is allowed, specified as a percentage of the earned income of the spouse with 
S.8 Sen. Daschle (D-SD) lower earnings. 
S.2053 Sen. Jeffords (R-VT) Marriage tax relief for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit is given. 
S.2305 Sen. Bayh (D-IN) Marriage tax relief for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit is given, and a nonrefundable marriage tax credit is 
S.2403 Sen. Bayh (D-IN) given to married couples filing jOintly. 
H.R. 767 Rep. Thune (R-SD) The tax brackets for married couples filing jOintly are increased to double the brackets of single taxpayers. 
S.1379 Sen. Dominici (R-NM) The tax rates for all taxpayers are reduced, and the tax rates for low- and middle-income married couples filing jOintly are 
further reduced. 
S. 799 Sen. Campbell (R-CO) The standard deduction for married couples filing jointly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers, 
and the tax rates for all taxpayers are reduced. 
H.R. 2350 Rep. Johnson (R-TX) The standard deduction for married couples filing jOintly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers, 
H.R. 2414 Rep. Tancredo (R-CO) and the tax brackets for married couples filing jointly are increased to double the brackets of single taxpayers. 
S.12 Sen. Hutchinson (R-TX) 
H.R. 6 Rep. Weller (R-IL) Marriage tax relief for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit is given, the standard deduction for married couples I 
filing jointly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers, and the 15 percent tax bracket is expanded 
for married couples filing jOintly. 
S.2346 Sen. Roth (R-DE) Marriage tax relief for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit is given, the standard deduction for married couples 
filing jOintly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers, the 15 and 28 percent tax brackets are 
expanded for married couples filing jointly, and family tax credits are protected from the Alternative Minimum Tax. 
H.R. 2488 Rep. Archer (R-TX) Marriage tax relief for recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit is given, the standard deduction for married couples 
S.1429 Sen. Roth (R-DE) filing jOintly is increased to double the standard deduction for single taxpayers, and the tax rates for all taxpayers are 
reduced. 
S.15 Sen. Hutchinson (R-TX) Income splitting and separate filing for married couples are allowed. 
-~ 
Table 5. 
The Change in the Singles Tax from Marriage Tax Relief Legislation a 
Nature of Proposed Marriage Tax Relief 
Add 
Income Level Double Secondary Increase Reduce All 
Standard Earner EITe Double Marginal Tax 
Deduction Deduction, Phase-out Married Tax Rates 
51/49,75/25 by $3000 Brackets by 5 percent 
0 0 0,0 0 0 0 
5000 0 0,0 0 0 0 
10,000 0 0,0 +230 0 -148 
15,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
20,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
25,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
30,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
35,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
40,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
45,000 +210 0,0 0 0 -283 
50,000 +210 +735, +375 0 0 -283 
60,000 +392 +823, +420 0 +553 -283 
70,000 +392 0,0 0 +1099 -283 
80,000 +392 0,0 0 +1099 -283 
90,000 +392 0,0 0 +1099 -283 
100,000 +392 0,0 0 +1099 -283 
125,000 +434 0,0 0 +1346 -283 
150,000 +434 0,0 0 +1724 -310 
175,000 +504 0,0 0 +1912 -337 
200,000 +504 0,0 0 +3189 -337 
225,000 +504 0,0 0 +4494 -310 
250,000 +504 0,0 0 +5799 -282 
275,000 +504 0,0 0 +6822 -227 
300,000 +555 0,0 0 +7149 -172 
350,000 +555 0,0 0 +8969 -145 
a All calculations assume the use of the relevant standard deduction, the use by 2-person married couples of 
the tax schedule for married couples filing a joint return, no transfer payments, and no equivalence scales. 
Figure1: Singles Tax (Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayer): 
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Figure 2: Singles Tax (Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayer): 
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Figure 3: Singles Tax (Single Taxpayer versus Married Taxpayer): 
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